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Abstract:  Recent  developments  in  neuroscience,  cognitive  science,  psychology,  and  
philosophy  of  mind  contradict  Descartes’s  rejection  of  the  body’s  role  in  thinking.  This  
presentation  describes  implications  for  adult  learning.  
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Introduction  
Researchers  and  theoreticians  in  such  varied  fields  as  cognitive  science,  neuroscience,  
psychology,  and  philosophy  of  mind  have  over  the  last  two  decades  explored  new  perspectives  
on  the  brain  and  implications  for  learning  and  knowing.  As  adult  educators  for  35-­‐‑plus  years,  
we  have  actively  followed  these  evolutions  looking  for  potential  applications  to  practice.  Given  
our  positions  outside  these  disciplines,  we  noticed  similarities  across  their  emerging  views  of  the  
underlying  processes  of  learning.  By  foregrounding  several  overlapping  findings  that  appear  
most  relevant  to  the  field  of  adult  learning,  we  hope  to  prompt  practitioner-­‐‑based  research  that  
may  substantiate  and  guide  new  approaches  to  best  practices  in  the  field  of  adult  education.        
 
The  Mind-­‐‑Body  Question  Redux  
For  over  400  years,  Western  thought  about  what  constitutes  knowing  has  been  overshadowed  by  
Descartes’  mind-­‐‑body  dualism,  expressed  in  his  oft-­‐‑quoted  maxim:  “I  think,  therefore  I  am.”    As  
he  saw  it,  thinking  (cognition)  should  be  free  of  the  distracting  and  potentially  deceptive  cues  
the  senses  (the  body)  might  provide.            
Less  well  known  is  how  fully  Descartes  embraced  this  premise.    As  reported  by  
McGilchrist  (2010),  Descartes  went  so  far  as  to  question  why  his  body’s  sensations  of  hunger  
should  be  connected  to  his  mind’s  desire  to  eat,  why  a  feeling  of  pain  should  lead  to  mental  
distress,  or  whether  he  even  had  a  body.    From  Descartes’  Meditation  IV:  
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I  can  make  probable  conjecture  that  the  body  exists.  But  this  is  only  a  probability;  
and  despite  a  careful  and  comprehensive  investigation,  I  do  not  yet  see  how  the  
distinct  idea  of  corporeal  nature  which  I  find  in  my  imagination  can  provide  any  
basis  for  a  necessary  inference  that  some  body  exists.  (McGilchrist,  2010,  p.  333)  
Given  how  widely  accepted  Descartes’  pronouncements  have  been,  most  people  fail  to  notice  
that  they  continue  to  inform  how  we  commonly  think  about  cognition.    Though  a  few  dictionary  
definitions  of  “the  mental  process  of  knowing”  include  the  senses  and  experience  (usually  in  
secondary  definitions),  most  focus  primarily  or  exclusively  on  awareness,  judgment,  thought,  
understanding—that  is,  conscious  mental  activities.    
In  reality,  neuroscience  shows  that  what  we  call  thought  is  the  caboose  of  a  long  train  of  
meaning  that  begins  with  the  body’s  responses  to  external  and  internal  environments.    Memory  
that  can  be  articulated  and  reason  that  can  be  explained  emerge  at  the  end  of  complex,  non-­‐‑
conscious  embodied  processes  that  involve  associating  current  and  prior  memory  traces  and  
body  states.  Only  then  are  these  consciously  recollected  (literally,  re-­‐‑collected)  (Damasio,  2010).  
And  because  people  become  aware  of  the  fruits  of  their  embodied  cognition  only  after  the  
invisible  work  is  done,  they  are  left  with  the  subjective  impression  that  mind  can  be  separate  
from  body.    
Though  Descartes’  perspective  continues  to  profoundly  affect  Western  thought,  
especially  in  terms  of  what  people  believe  about  knowledge,  thinking,  and  reasoning,  new  
research  on  how  the  brain  learns  foregrounds  the  role  of  emotions  (Immordino-­‐‑Yang,  2007)—
and  emotions  are,  in  fact,  specifically  an  expression  of  what  is  happening  in  the  body.  
 
Emotions  and  Feelings  
Neuroscientists,  though  generally  not  social  scientists,  currently  distinguish  between  emotions  
and  feelings.  According  to  Damasio  (2000),  emotions  describe  the  brain’s  internal-­‐‑to-­‐‑body  
responses  to  environmental  stimuli  (that  is,  “body  state”);  feelings  are  conscious  and  subjective  
perceptions  of  those  changes  in  body  state.  As  an  example,  a  typical  driver  who  has  to  swerve  
sharply  to  avoid  an  accident  is  likely  to  feel  the  adrenaline,  increased  heart-­‐‑rate,  and  other  body-­‐‑
state  reactions  as  fear  and/or  fury.  By  contrast,  a  professional  race-­‐‑car  driver  in  the  identical  
situation  may  well  ascribe  feelings  of  exhilaration  and  satisfaction  to  those  same  emotions  or  
body-­‐‑state.    Even  so,  memory  traces  of  any  experience  always  include  the  associated  body-­‐‑state  
and  these  ancient  reservoirs  of  emotional  reaction  continue  to  invisibly  affect  our  responses  in  
the  present.  
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Two  parts  of  the  brain  most  involved  in  anxiety-­‐‑related  emotions,  the  hippocampus  and  
the  amygdala,  are  also  essential  to  memory  formation  (Phelps,  2006).  This  underscores  the  fact  
that  in  attending  to  what  are  considered  the  cognitive  aspects  of  adult  learning,  educators  must  
remain  alert  to  adults’  emotions,  as  well.    “In  one  form  or  another,  emotional  issues  never  seem  
very  far  from  the  surface  in  an  adult  learning  context,”  and  attending  appropriately  to  this  
reality  is  among  “the  most  important  and  challenging  tasks  for  the  educator”  (Dirkx,  2008,  p.  9).      
Furthermore,  emotion  is  also  the  hidden  source  of  motivation  to  think  and  to  learn,  as  
these  are  essential  to  accomplish  the  brain’s  prime  objective  of  insuring  survival  and  advancing  
well-­‐‑being  (Meyer,  2006).  Without  emotional  input,  the  brain  may  be  able  to  solve  discrete  
problems  (such  as  during  laboratory  tests  of  cognitive  function),  but  it  cannot  make  evaluative  
decisions  leading  to  appropriate  action  (Damasio,  1994).  The  organism’s  most  basic  survival  
decision—what  to  move  toward  and  what  to  move  away  from—is  hopelessly  compromised  in  
the  absence  of  emotion.  Without  such  body-­‐‑based  cues,  social  decision-­‐‑making  is  fatally  flawed.  
Siegel  (1999)  explains:  “generated  by  the  value  systems  of  the  brain,  these  emotional  activations  
pervade  all  mental  functions  and  literally  create  meaning  in  life.  In  this  way,  we  can  say  that  
emotion  and  meaning  are  created  by  the  same  processes”  (p.  158).    
David  Gelernter  (1994),  a  leading  figure  in  artificial  intelligence,  also  points  critically  to  
the  preponderance  of  claims  that  conflate  rationality,  logical  thought,  and  problem-­‐‑solving:    
Emotions  are  fundamental  to  thought;  but  the  body,  inconveniently  enough,  is  
fundamental  to  emotions  .  .  .  .  [It  therefore]  becomes  inescapable  that  you  don’t  
think  just  with  your  brain;  you  think  with  your  body  too  .  .  .Emotions  are  not  
[merely]  a  form  of  thought,  not  an  additional  way  to  think,  not  a  special  cognitive  
bonus,  but  are  fundamental  to  thought.  (pp.  46-­‐‑47)      
Unfortunately,  the  emphasis  on  learning  and  thinking  primarily  as  rational,  cognitive  activities  
effectively  diminishes  the  powerful  potential  of  intentionally  learning  with  and  through  the  
body—which  is,  ironically,  the  only  way  the  brain  can  ever  learn.  
 
Learning  and  Embodiment  
Learning  is  the  final  step  in  a  process  that  takes  place  throughout  the  body  before  we  can  
discover  that  we  “know”  something.  Most  people  think  about  the  brain  in  terms  of  conscious,  
reflective,  self-­‐‑aware,  decision-­‐‑making  activities,  but  “the  biological  mind  is,  first  and  foremost,  
an  organ  for  controlling  the  biological  body  .  .  .  Minds  are  not  disembodied  logical  reasoning  
devices”  (Clark,  1997,  p.  1).  The  brain  is  not  just  inside  the  skull  like  a  walnut  in  a  shell.  It  is  
functionally  a  body-­‐‑brain,  connected  with  and  responsive  to  every  part  of  the  body.  And  every  
part  of  the  body  contributes  to  all  the  functions  of  brain.    
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Though  the  term  cognitive  focuses  on  knowing  through  perception  and  awareness  as  well  
as  reason,  hardly  acknowledged—except  in  the  “seat  of  cognition”  sense—is  how  the  brain  
achieves  those  outcomes.  Missing  is  the  piece  that  Descartes  discarded,  the  body.  Antonio  
Damasio  (1994)  described  the  essence  of  Descartes’  Error:  
[T]he  abyssal  separation  between  body  and  mind  .  .  .  the  suggestion  that  reason,  
and  moral  judgment,  and  the  suffering  that  comes  from  physical  pain  or  
emotional  upheaval  might  exist  separately  from  the  body.  Specifically:  the  
separation  of  the  most  refined  operations  of  mind  from  the  structure  and  
operation  of  a  biological  organism.  (pp.  249-­‐‑250)    
In  contrast  to  Descartes,  current  research  finds  that  “we  feel,  therefore  we  learn”  (Immordino-­‐‑
Yang  &  Damasio,  2007).  Between  perception  and  knowing  is  the  embodied  brain  busily  
constructing  what  we  eventually  recognize  as  meaning  that  we  are  aware  of  and  can  attempt  to  
articulate:  Learning  is  a  whole-­‐‑body  experience.  “Cognition  is  embodied,”  Kahneman  (2011)  
states  unequivocally,  “you  think  with  your  body,  not  only  your  brain”  (p.  51).  
Learning  activities  that  focus  almost  entirely  on  reading,  writing,  and  speaking  ignore  
aspects  of  somatic,  tacit  knowing  that  precede  awareness.  As  Polanyi  noted,  “We  know  more  
than  we  can  say”  (Polanyi  &  Grene,  1969,  p.  113).  The  rational,  critical  approach  largely  ignores  
the  fact  that  “the  source  of  cognition  is  not  just  the  naked  brain,  but  the  brain  in  concert  with  the  
sensing,  acting  body  .  .  .  [as  it]  intervenes  with  the  environment”  (Clark,  1997,  p.  x).      
 
Patterns  and  Metaphors      
According  to  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  embodied  cognitive  science  is  premised  on  
the  idea  that  cognition  requires  the  entire  body,  not  just  the  brain:  “[It]  is  a  dynamic  
sensorimotor  activity,  and  the  world  that  is  given  and  experienced  is  not  only  conditioned  by  
the  neural  activity  of  the  subject,  but  is  essentially  enacted  in  that  it  emerges  through  the  bodily  
activities  of  the  organism”  (Wilson  &  Foglia,  2017,  n.p.).      
Embodiment  is  relevant  in  two  ways.  First,  the  portal  between  brain  and  world  is  the  
body’s  sensory  apparatus;  second,  making  sense  of  those  sensations  is  a  function  of  how  we  
experience  our  body  in  relation  to  them—through  analogy  and  metaphor.  This  process  begins  at  
birth.  In  the  newborn  infant,  “even  the  simplest  act  of  recognition  of  an  object  can  be  understood  
only  in  terms  of  her  own  activity.  Out  of  this  she  must  construct  the  entire  edifice  of  the  
phenomenological  world  .  .  .”  by  comparing  each  new  experience  (stimulus)  to  the  “pregiven”  
world—that  is,  as  it  has  already  been  experienced  (Varela,  Thompson,  &  Rosch,  1991,  p.  176).  
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Though  adults  have  more,  and  more  varied,  experiential  material  to  draw  on,  the  
fundamental  process  of  learning  at  any  age  is  based  on  creating  and  elaborating  networks  of  
neural  associations.  Once  a  stimulus  has  passed  the  threshold  of  attention,  the  brain  
immediately  categorizes  it  by  comparing  the  unknown  to  the  known.    It  seeks  similarities  
between  this  experience  and  previous  experiences  in  order  to  connect  it  to  existing  patterns.  
Edelman  (2006)  explains,  “Brains  operate  .  .  .  .  not  by  logic  but  rather  by  pattern  recognition  .  .  .  .  
It  is  likely  that  early  human  thought  proceeded  by  metaphor  .  .  .  which  continues  to  be  a  major  
source  of  imagination  and  creativity  in  adult  life”  (p.  85).  
Though  our  subjective  experience  of  thinking  is  something  we  can  articulate,  all  thought  
originates  in  the  embodied  brain’s  activity  of  non-­‐‑verbal  analogical  association.  If  the  brain  
could  speak,  it  would  ask  itself:  how  do  traces  of  earlier  experiences,  now  part  of  countless  neural  
networks,  relate  to  this  new  stimulus?  
Even  abstract  thinking  depends  on  metaphor.  “Our  deepest  and  most  abiding  
concepts—time,  events,  causation,  morality,  and  mind  itself—are  understood  and  reasoned  
about  via  multiple  metaphors”  (Lakoff  &  Johnson,  2003,  p.  245).  Because  these  analogical  
associations  are  the  brain’s  primary  references,  everything  we  come  to  know  and  understand,  
including  the  most  abstract  concepts,  originated  with  embodiment.    
 
Embodiment  Directs  Cognition  
Empirical  research  also  demonstrates  how  the  body-­‐‑brain  connection  affects  presumably  
objective  interpretations  of  “reality.”  In  one  case,  research  participants  were  asked  to  evaluate  a  
psychological  case  study.  Shortly  before  being  handed  a  profile,  they  were  casually  asked  to  
briefly  hold  either  a  warm  or  cold  beverage.  Those  who  had  held  the  warm  beverage  
determined  the  person  in  the  case  study  had  the  attributes  of  a  “warm”  person  (e.g.,  
approachable,  caring)  and  those  who  had  held  the  cold  cup  found  the  same  case  described  the  
attributes  of  a  “cool”  person  (e.g.,  distant,  aloof)  (Williams  &  Bargh,  2008).      
In  another  study,  participants  playing  a  computer  game  didn’t  know  that  the  game  was  
rigged  to  induce  feelings  of  minor  rejection  and  isolation,  based  on  short-­‐‑changing  the  number  
of  turns  they  were  allowed.  When  the  game  was  over,  those  who  had  been  left  out  of  full  
participation  perceived  the  temperature  in  the  room  as  cooler  than  it  was.    In  effect,  as  the  
researchers  explicitly  noted,  the  embodied  metaphor  of  cold  and  lonely  affected  their  experience  
of  the  physical  world  around  them  (Zhong  &  Leonardelli,  2008).      
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Move  Over,  Descartes!  
Given  the  power  of  Descartes’  dictum  over  the  Western  imagination,  people  have  increasingly  
come  to  believe  in  rationality  and  logic.    Note  the  irony:  we  believe  in  logic.  In  fact,  in  the  brain  
metaphor  precedes  logic.  First  the  brain  uses  symbols  and  images;  only  then  does  it  begin  to  
construct  words  and  a  logical  story.  Body  and  emotions—experience  and  a  felt  sense—rather  
than  logical  thinking  are  the  first  responders  in  any  learning  experience  (Kasl  &  Yorks,  2016).      
Laboring  under  the  misapprehensions  of  Descartes,  the  field  of  education  has  largely  
failed  to  take  into  account  that  embodied  experience  is  always  the  basis  of  cognition.  Focusing  
primarily  on  cognitive  and  verbal  approaches  tends  to  ignore  aspects  of  learning  related  to  the  
senses,  the  emotions,  and  the  body.  Activities  such  as  role-­‐‑play,  simulations,  and  other  explicitly  
embodied  experiences  usually  appear  as  ancillary  to  the  main  work  of  explicit,  verbal  (i.e.,  
“cognitive”)  learning.  (Verbal  approaches  that  focus  on  metaphor,  irony,  and  symbolism,  such  
as  poetry,  drama,  and  story,  avoid  many  of  these  limitations.)    
Learning  focused  primarily  on  cognitive  abilities—typically  meaning  “higher”  mental  
activities  of  reasoning  and  problem-­‐‑solving—also  privileges  what  gets  to  be  considered  
legitimate  learning.  It  emphasizes  linearity  rather  than  a  more  complex  and  relational  way  of  
anchoring  learning.  This  marginalizes  cultures  that  do  not  fit  the  dominant  Western  cognitive  
mold  and  individuals  who  learn  in  ways  that  explicitly  use  their  senses  and  bodies  (Lawrence,  
2005).      
Rather  than  Descartes’  cogito  ergo  sum  (I  think,  therefore  I  am),  Marton  and  Booth  (1997)  
posit  cognosco  ergo  sum  (I  experience,  therefore  I  am),  because  learning  “is  an  ongoing  
exploration  of  the  world  as  experienced”  (p.  156).    Neuroscience  has  only  recently  articulated  
the  implications  of  affective  and  social  neuroscience  on  educational  theory:  “the  relation  
between  learning,  emotion,  and  body  state  runs  much  deeper  than  many  educators  realize  and  
is  interwoven  with  the  notion  of  learning  itself”  (Immordino-­‐‑Yang  &  Damasio,  2007,  p.  3).    
Cartesian  dualism  has  finally  been  laid  to  rest.  In  reality,  we  feel,  therefore  we  learn.  
Though  Descartes  questioned  the  utility  of  the  body,  educators  must  now  acknowledge  the  
essential  role  the  “embodied  brain”  plays  in  construction  of  knowledge.  
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